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AUSTRALIA'S EXAMPLE OF TREATMENT
TOWARDS NATIVE TITLE: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE'S LAND RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA
AND THE UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
With the end of the twentieth century quickly approach-
ing, the world's focus has shifted from a capitalist, gain-seek-
ing mentality towards a sympathy and respect for needy and
less fortunate humans. Consequently, a global emphasis has
been placed on indigenous people' and their rights.' Remark-
ably, 1993 was proclaimed the International Year of the
World's Indigenous People by the United Nations,3 and the
1. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities has defined indigenous people as:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that de-
veloped on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sec-
tors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them.
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued exis-
tence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.
Jos6 R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous
Populations, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, vol. 5, para. 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/198617/Add.4 (1986). See
also John Skinner, Native People, Foreign Laws: A Survey Comparing Aboriginal
Title to Property in the United States and Australia, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 235, 235 n.2 (1995). For a further discussion on the definition of indigenous
people, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International
Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 663-64 n.4 (1990).
2. A concern for indigenous people's rights has recently gained a place on the
international human rights agenda. See S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms
In Contemporary International Law, 8 ARIz. J. INTiL COMP. L. 1, 4 (1991); Wil-
liams, supra note 1, at 663-64 n.4 (discussing the trend of the international com-
munity, comprised of indigenous and non-indigenous scholars, towards actively
exploring the topic of indigenous people's rights in the context of international
law).
3. G.A. Res. 45, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/45/164 (1991). Professor McSloy observed that the U.N. declared 1993 as the
International Year of the World's Indigenous People in anticipation of the expected
interest that would be shown in the indigenous peoples current situation after the
1992 anniversary of Columbus' "discovery" of America. See Steven Paul McSloy,
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General Assembly marked the 1990s as the International De-
cade of the World's Indigenous People.4 Today, it seems, indig-
enous people are gaining more influence in the international
arena and an increased recognition of their rights is necessary
to preserve peace within and between nations.5 However, the
struggle to reach this level of acceptance has not been easy.
Prior to this trend of recognition, the international arena
treated indigenous people solely as "subjects of the exclusive
domestic jurisdiction of the settler state regimes that invaded
their territories and established hegemony during prior colo-
nial eras."' This perception brought forth a concern for indige-
nous people's rights, specifically with respect to the land which
they claim was once rightfully theirs. Indigenous people world-
wide were thrust from their lands by European settlers over
the course of centuries.! Land was more to the indigenous
people than merely a place to live. It meant even more to them
than their home and livelihood! The respect and attachment
that indigenous people maintained with their land was some-
thing that no modern day individual could fully comprehend.9
"Land ownership was intertwined with the ideal of self-deter-
mination of indigenous peoples, along with their ability to
choose the extent of their participation in the lives of the na-
Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 20 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 294 (1993).
4. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 51st Sess., 82nd mtg. at 107, U.N. Doc.
ARES/51178 (1997). See also Karen E. Bravo, Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land
and the Demands of Economic Development: Lessons from the United States and
Australia, 30 COLuM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 529, 531 (1997).
5. Due to such incidents as the dissolutions of Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union, and the revolt of the Mayan Indians in Chiapas, Mexico, it seems that a
focus on indigenous issues is essential in order to preserve international peace. See
Steven C. Perkins, Indigenous Peoples and International Organizations: Issues and
Responses, 23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 217, 218 (1995).
6. Williams, supra note 1, at 664.
7. See Skinner, supra note 1, at 236. Approximately 300 million people in
the world are indigenous. They are represented in such vast lands as New Zea-
land, Botswana and Norway. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 530 n.4.
8. See Gary D. Meyers & John Mugambwa, The Mabo Decision: Australian
Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition, 23 ENVTL. L. 1203, 1203-04 (1993).
9. See id. at 1204. The English language does not do justice to the
Aboriginal's sense of their land.
The Aboriginal would speak of 'earth' and use the word in a richly sym-
bolic way to mean his 'shoulder' or his 'side'. I have seen an Aboriginal
embrace the earth he walked on. To put our words 'home' and 'land'
together into 'homeland' is a little better but not much.
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tions that have grown up around them, their ability to pre-
serve their unique cultural heritage without outside interfer-
ence, and their ability to choose the lifestyles that they de-
sire." Despite this recognized relationship between indige-
nous peoples and their land, it was not until the latter part of
the twentieth century that efforts were made to recognize
these people's land claims and attempts were made towards
rectification.
Australia and the United States are two countries with
mass populations of indigenous people. They are also countries
with abundant natural wealth and resources. Consequently,
the imbalance in the allocation of these resources among the
indigenous people and the white settlers of these countries has
led to significant domestic conflicts. In addition, these two
countries provide a particularly useful source of comparison
because they were each settled by English colonists." Al-
though both Australia and the United States emulated the
English common law system of land ownership, they each
restructured it for their own purposes.12 These different out-
looks on land ownership starkly contrast one another and
provide the root of the debate on treatment towards native
title which has ensued."
This Note examines the struggle faced by indigenous peo-
ple in acquiring their land in Australia and the United States.
Section II will provide a historical analysis of how Australia
has prevented its Aborigines from retaining their property, as
well as the positive strides it has made in the latter part of
this century towards remedying the situation. This section will
evaluate the significant cases and legislation involving Aborigi-
nal land rights and the impact that both have had on the Ab-
original community. An emphasis will be placed on the 1992
case of Mabo v. Queensland,4 in which the High Court of
Australia abandoned the traditional notion of terra nullius5
10. Bravo, supra note 4, at 532.
11. See infra Sections II.A, III.A.
12. Compare infra Sections II.A, III.A.
13. The term "native title" describes the interests and rights of the indigenous
people in their land, whether communal or individual, possessed under their tradi-
tional customs and laws. See Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1, 41 (Austl.).
14. Id.
15. Terra nullius is a Latin word which is translated as "uninhabited land."
Melissa Manwaring, Recent Development, 34 HARV. INTL L.J. 177, 177 n.2 (1993).
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and acknowledged the Aborigines' rights to their homeland.16
Section III will be an analysis of the significant cases and
legislation that have developed with respect to the Native
Americans of the United States. Distinct to this section will be
a discussion of the early treatment of Native Americans as
independent nations and a historical tour of how this ideology
has taken a drastic change for the worse. In this analysis,
specific attention will be paid to the early nineteenth century
cases adjudged by Chief Justice John Marshall, as well as the
major cases and legislative battles that have ensued in the
past two centuries. This section will end with a look at the
future of Native American land rights and provide suggestions
for improvements.
Section IV will be a comparison of Australia and the Unit-
ed States. Having such similar beginnings and prominent roles
in today's society, Australia and the United States provide
excellent sources for a comparison of native title treatment.
Within this context, this Note will evaluate the legal and non-
legal remedies that each country has attempted to use and
extract from each worthy examples that can serve other na-
tions in need of redress. This Note will specifically address the
comparisons of each country's treatment upon colonization and
the effects that the accessibility to the courts has had on each
nation.
Section V of this Note will propose that although both
countries still need major improvements, Australia has gained
better strides in this arena within the last decade, has less of a
firm history, and a greater willingness to be flexible. Therefore,
Australia sets the finest example of treatment towards native
title, and the rest of the world should follow her lead.
Terra nullius has been used as an international law doctrine to essentially extin-
guish the title of the original inhabitants based on the principle that such inhabit-
ants were not of a sufficient level of civilization to "own" the land effectively. See
Bravo, supra note 4, at 549 n.110. Simply put, it is defined as territory "practical-
ly unoccupied." See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 4.
16. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 2.
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II. ABORIGINE'S STRUGGLE IN AUSTRALIA
A. History
Long before Captain James Cook claimed Australia as a
territory of England in 1788,' the Aborigines were living on
the land and using it as both their livelihood and a source of
identity.18 Yet, from the late eighteenth century on, England
consistently dominated and deprived the Aboriginal communi-
ties of their rights. Unlike its practices with other colonized
areas, England did not sign any treaties with the Aborigines or
provide them any compensation for their losses. 9 Instead, the
implementation of English law in Australia in 1828, coupled
with the doctrine of terra nullius, left the Aborigines dispos-
sessed of their land." An example of this is seen in the adop-
tion of the Pacific Islanders Protection Acts,2' which ended
the slave trade and gave the English court jurisdiction over its
people in the Western Pacific Islands." Similarly, in 1879
Queen Victoria officially annexed the Murray Islands to Aus-
tralia.' All the while, the British government completely ig-
nored the rights of the Meriam people inhabiting the Murray
Islands and disregarded the international law detailing how to
acquire sovereignty.' Nonetheless, England was found to
have acquired sovereignty through the doctrine of terra nullius
because it was viewed that no other owners existed.25 Eng-
land was legally able to do this because the doctrine of terra
nullius had been expanded to include ownership of land al-
ready inhabited so long as the original inhabitants were so
17. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 549.
18. See Meyers & Mugambwa, supra note 8, at 1204.
19. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 550. For a comparison of England's treatment
upon colonization, see infra Section IIIA.
20. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 550. The concept of terra nullius was so in-
grained in the settler's psyche that when Australia adopted its own Constitution
in 1900, the only references to Aborigines were to forbid the Parliament from
making any laws with respect to them, AusTL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxvi)
(altered 1967), and to deny their inclusion in Australia's census, id. ch. VII, § 127
(repealed 1967). See also Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 80.
21. Pacific Islanders Protection Act, 1872, 35 & 36 Vict., ch. 19 (Eng).
22. Id.; Pacific Islanders Protection Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., ch. 51 (Eng).
23. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 1, 10.
24. International law recognizes three ways of acquiring sovereignty: conquest,
cession, and occupation of territory that is terra nullius. See id at 21.
25. See id. at 27.
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"primitive" that they did not have any of their own ascertain-
able laws and no other actual claims to the land were
known.26
In addition to extinguishing the Aborigine's title to their
land, European colonization practically destroyed the Aborigi-
nal culture. Prior to colonization, it is estimated that
300,000 Aborigines, speaking 600 dialects, inhabited Austra-
lia.' By the beginning of the twentieth century, it is believed
that seventy-five percent of the population was killed by either
infectious diseases brought into the country by settlers or by
violent attacks instigated by settlers.29 As the Aboriginal pop-
ulation diminished, the Aborigines were forced into reserva-
tions, which were located in desolate areas secluded from the
European society."0
B. Significant Early Challenges
Given the tumultuous relationship between the Aborigines
and English settlers, Aborigines brought many suits against
the Commonwealth government to try to regain their rights to
the land. Unfortunately for the Aborigines, these suits were
consistently unsuccessful.
The first challenge to the doctrine of terra nullius was
made in the 1970s, nearly 200 years after the Aborigines were
deprived of their land. This case, entitled Milirrpum v.
Nabalco Pty. Ltd.3 (or the "Gove" case), was brought by the
Yirrkala Aborigines of the Gove Peninsula, which is located in
the Northern Territory of Australia. In their suit, the Yirrkalas
people applied to the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory
for an injunction to stop bauxite mining taking place on their
land, as well as judicial recognition of their right to the land
and compensatory damages." In line with their unwillingness
to recognize Aboriginal land rights, the Court rejected all the
Aborigines' claims. 3 Justice Blackburn opined that Australia
26. See id.
27. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 550.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 551.
30. See id.
31. (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141 (Austl.).
32. See id. at 141-42, 144.
33. See id. at 293.
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did not recognize communal native title, that the Yirrkalas
people did not sufficiently show that they had a continual
connection to the land since 1788, and that their relationship
to the territory did not create a right of property.34 This case
holds historical significance, however, because it held that
Aboriginal rights could exist, but they must be created by stat-
ute.35
The "Gove" case was also significant because it gave impe-
tus to the movement towards recognizing Aboriginal land
rights and resulted in the passage of the Aboriginal Land
Rights (Northern Territory) Act36 in 1976 (Land Rights Act).
The Land Rights Act gave an Aborigine statutory title to land
once he proved that he had owned that land. However, it was
limited in its application because a claim had to be filed under
the Act by June 5, 1997, s7 and the Act was only applicable to
land within the Northern Territory of Australia." Subsequent
to the adoption of the Land Rights Act, Aboriginal reserve
lands within the Northern Territory were put into land
trusts,39 where the Commonwealth government continued to
exercise a significant amount of control.4" The land trans-
ferred to such trusts constituted approximately eighteen per-
cent of the Northern Territory.4
Another important case brought by the Aborigines under a
similar challenge to their land was Coe v. Commonwealth of
Australia.42 In 1979, Coe, an Aborigine, instigated a sweeping
challenge on behalf of all indigenous Australians against the
Australian and British government, seeking injunctive relief
preventing anyone from using land that the Aborigines were
34. See id.
35. See Skinner, supra note 1, at 242.
36. Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act, 1976, ch. 119 (Austl.).
37. Bravo, supra note 4, at 552.
38. See Aboriginal Land Rights Act, § 4. The Act only applies to the Northern
Territory because, although it has some aspects of self-government, the Northern
Territory is still not a state. Therefore, the Commonwealth can pass general legis-
lation for it. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 552 n.135.
39. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 553.
40. See Matthew C. Miller, Comment, An Australian Nunavut? A Comparison
of Inuit and Aboriginal Rights Movements in Canada and Australia, 12 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 1175, 1195 (1998).
41. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 552-53.
42. (1979) 24 A.L.R. 118 (Austl.).
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currently using." The Coe case was dismissed on procedural
grounds, denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint."
Nonetheless, it is still a monumental case because it showed
the Court that there may well be a legitimate question as to
whether the Aborigines had an actual interest in the land
before colonization.45 Most notably, Justice Murphy, in his
dissent, reasoned that Coe's allegation that New South Whales
was conquered rather than settled was justifiable.4" He sug-
gested that it was possible that the Aborigines had occupied
the land at the time the settlers claimed it as terra nullius,
and, therefore, Coe should be afforded the opportunity to ex-
plore this claim.4" Thus, although the High Court dismissed
Coe, the case suggested that if another case was brought on
narrower grounds, the Aborigines could possibly have a suc-
cessful claim for native title.4" The dissent in Coe provided a
guideline to be followed in future cases.
C. Mabo v. Queensland49
Arguably the most momentous case to come before the
Australian courts" was brought in 1982 by the Meriam peo-
ple of the Murray Islands."' The plaintiffs in Mabo sought a
43. See id. at 120, 123. See also Manwaring, supra note 15, at 180-81.
44. See Coe, 24 A.L.R. at 120, 123. See also Manwaring, supra note 15, at 81.
45. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 181.
46. Id.
47. See Coe, 24 A.L.R. at 137-38 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 137.
49. (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1. (Austl.).
50. Mabo was an especially significant case because it was the first major
case to break away from looking to English courts for precedent. Because the
ultimate court of appeal for Australia is the Privy Council in London, Australia
has traditionally looked to English courts rather than looking to the United States
or Commonwealth courts. Here, however, the High Court drew upon cases from
both the United States and Canada to support conclusions which would otherwise
have been contrary to Australian law. See Peter Butt, The Mabo Case and its
Aftermath: Indigenous Land Title in Australia, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY 495, 496 (G.E. van Maanen & A.J. van Walt
eds., 1996).
51. Eddie Mabo and four others brought a claim on behalf of the Meriam
people, inhabitants of the Murray Islands, which form part of the State of
Queensland, Australia, and lie in the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua
New Guinea. See Dianne Otto, A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims
to Sovereignty in Australia, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 65, 66 n.2 (1995).
The people of the Murray Islands are Melanesian, see Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 8, and
different from mainland Aborigines in their cultural and social history. See Gerald
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declaration that "the Meriam people [were] entitled to the
Murray Islands ... that the Murray Islands [were] not and
never [had] been 'Crown Lands' ... and ... that the State of
Queensland [was] not entitled to extinguish the title of the
Meriam people."52 After ten years of litigation, the High Court
made a historic decision by reversing the decision in Milirrpum
and overruling the notion of terra nullius.53
The main issues presented in Mabo were whether the
annexation of the Murray Islands had vested absolute benefi-
cial ownership and/or sovereignty of the islands in the Crown;
and, second, whether native title to the Murray Islands, if it
had ever existed, had been extinguished by actions that oc-
curred after the annexation.54 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that
the interest that their ancestors enjoyed in the land before
annexation survived "acquisition by the British Crown and
became a dimension of the Common law," or "native title."55
On the other hand, the defendant, the State of Queensland,
argued that even assuming that common law native title exist-
ed, it was extinguished by annexation."
In a 6-1 decision, the High Court of Australia ruled that
native title to land is in fact recognized in Australia. In accept-
ing the concept of common law native title, the Court essential-
ly overruled Justice Blackburn's decision in Milirrpum 7 Sig-
nificantly, the Mabo decision applies to the entire country, and
not just to the Meriam Islands.58 Justice Brennan, writing for
P. McGinley, Indigenous Peoples' Rights: Mabo and Others v. State of
Queensland-The Australian High Court Addresses 200 Years of Oppression, 21
DENV. J. INTIL L. & POL'Y 311, 315-16 (1993).
52. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 55.
53. See id. at 56.
54. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 182.
55. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 137.
56. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 92 (Dawson, J., dissenting). There are four ways
to extinguish native title: surrender, abandonment, death, and executive or legis-
lative action. See id. at 83 (Deane and Guadron, JJ., concurring). For a further
discussion of extinguishment of native title, see Meyers & Mugambwa, supra note
8, at 1223-28.
57. See Mabo, A.L.R. at 77.
58. Justice Brennan writes:
[Tihe validity of the propositions in the defendant's chain of argument
cannot be determined by reference to circumstances unique to the Murray
Islands; they are advanced as general propositions of law applicable to
all settled colonies. Nor can the circumstances which might be thought to
differentiate the Murray Islands from other parts of Australia be invoked
529
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Chief Justices Mason and McHugh,59 acknowledged that the
concept of terra nullius was racially discriminatory and contra-
dictory to current international law.6" Native title remained as
long as the group occupying the land continued in its customs
and traditional connection with the land.61 The Court rejected
Justice Blackburn's notion that property includes the right to
use or enjoy the land, the right to exclude others, and the right
to alienate, which the Aborigines in Milirrpum did not satis-
fy. 2 On the contrary, Justice Brennan reasoned that "[tihe
ownership of land within a territory in the exclusive occupa-
tion of a people must be vested in that people," provided that
they have asserted effectively that no one else has the right to
use or occupy the land in question.63 In essence, the majority
rejected the European based concept of property rights and
found that common law native title existed for the Meriam
people." Thus, the plaintiffs successfully proved that their
rights to the Murray Islands survived annexation and that
their claim of title was not extinguished.65
Justices Deane and Gaudron wrote a separate opinion,
agreeing with Justice Brennan, except on the issue of compen-
sation.66 Although the plaintiffs only sought declaratory relief,
Justices Deane and Gaudron felt that compensatory damages
could be recovered only in situations where the common law
native title was wrongfully extinguished and that the proceed-
ings for such recovery were instituted within the applicable
statute of limitations period.67 Because native title is a legal
right, it follows that the government should be required to pay
for the damages that accrued by its actions."
of distinction discriminates on the basis of race or ethnic origin for it
denies the capacity of some categories of indigenous inhabitants to have
any rights or interests in land.
Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 15-16.
59. See id. at 2.
60. See id. at 41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 43-44.
62. See Milirrpum, 17 F.L.R. at 198; Skinner, supra note 1, at 242.
63. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 36 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. See id- at 56 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 90 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 169 (Toohey, J., concurring).
65. See id. at 169.
66. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 187.
67. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 85 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ., concurring).
68. See id.
530 [Vol. XXV:2
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for the damages that accrued by its actions."
Justice Toohey also wrote a separate opinion. Although he
reasoned that the Aborigine's rights were protected under com-
mon law, he questioned the notion that native title was an
inalienable right.69 In addition, he determined that in order
for the Crown to extinguish native title, it must do so by clear
and plain legislation.7
Justice Dawson was the lone dissenter in this historic
decision. He focused on the intentions of the settlers to occupy
the land, rather than on the rights of the indigenous people."
Not surprisingly, the only aspect of the majority decision that
he agreed with was that compensation was not necessary when
extinguishing native title.72
D. Aftermath of Mabo
The Mabo case represents a landmark for the judicial
treatment of Aborigines. Prior to Mabo, the issue of indigenous
people's land rights was addressed only in moral, ethical and
political terms.73 This was the first judicial challenge to meet
significant success. The Mabo decision could now be used as
binding precedent for future Aboriginal land claims.
Although it was monumental, the decision was somewhat
vague and left the Aborigines uncertain as to their specific
entitlements.74 The Meriam people were ideal plaintiffs for a
successful native title suit because they were biological descen-
dants of the original inhabitants of the Murray Islands and
68. See id.
69. See id. at 136-70 (Toohey, J., concurring).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 91-136 (Dawson, J., dissenting).
72. See id.
73. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 187-88.
74. G.P.J. McGinley observed:
The result of Mabo was that Aboriginal claimants who wanted to estab-
lish native title would have to show that they were an identifiable com-
munity or group that had a traditional occupancy or connection with the
land and that they had maintained that connection since annexation. Not
clear was to what extent the claimants had to demonstrate that they had
continued their original customs and traditions on the land. Once the
nature of the native title was determined, the court would protect this
native interest by prohibiting activities that were inconsistent with the
Aboriginal traditional way of life.
G.P.J. McGinley, Natural Resource Companies and Aboriginal Title to Land: The
Australian Experience-Mabo and its Aftermath, 28 INT'L LAW. 695, 703 (1994).
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maintained their customs and traditions.7" Other Aboriginal
groups would face difficult obstacles to establish their claims of
native title.7"
In response to Mabo, the Australian government passed
the Native Title Act of 1993. 7" The Act validated all prior acts
where native title was under the sole ownership of non-na-
tives.78 Simply stated, it had the effect of extinguishing all
native title over privately owned lands. Claimants were enti-
tled to compensation if their title was extinguished after the
enactment of the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination Act of
1975, 7" as long as they could demonstrate their connection
with the land at the time of annexation." The Act applied to
every Australian state as of January 1, 1994.81 A significant
aspect of the Act was a provision which enabled the Aborigines
to negotiate with the mining companies who wished to renew
their leases. However, the ultimate decision regarding mining
disputes was sent to an arbitral body and not left to the Ab-
origines." The Act also established the National Native Title
75. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 188-89. Other elements in favor of the
Meriam people's claim were that they lived in community villages, and the total
land they occupied was relatively small, encompassing only nine square kilometers.
Id. See also Butt, supra note 50, at 496. Moreover, because the Meriam people
handed down the land they occupied from generation to generation and gardening
was the prime source of their survival, they had a strong claim that they main-
tained a long-standing cultivation of the land. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at
188. In view of these facts, the Meriam people lived a very different lifestyle from
the nomadic Aborigines on the Australian mainland. See Butt, supra note 50, at
496.
76. See Manwaring, supra note 15, at 188-89.
77. Native Title Act, 1993, ch. 110 (Austl.).
78. See id. §§ 14, 19.
79. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 52 (Austl.). The Racial Discrimination
Act of 1975 was implemented to prevent bi-partisan racial discrimination in Aus-
tralia. Section 9 of the Act prohibits any "person to *do any act involving a distinc-
tion, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race . . . which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an
equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom . . . " Id. § 9(1). Unfor-
tunately, it has not proven effective in ending racial discrimination. See Miller,
supra note 40, at 1195.
80. The Native Title Act uses the word "connection" but does not specify
whether the connection must be physical or whether it may be spiritual. Whatever
the court interprets this to mean will be recognized within the meaning of the
Act. See Butt, supra note 50, at 505.
81. See Native Title Act, § 15(1)(b)(ii). See also Bravo, supra note 4, at 553-
54.
82. See generally Native Title Act, §§ 26-42.
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Tribunal, a mediating body, which would process and hear
native title claims and fund programs to assist disputes over
native title.' Claims heard by the Tribunal are not binding
and provisions are made for the claims to be heard in federal
court. As a result of Mabo and the Native Title Act of 1993,
over 300 native title claims were filed with the Tribunal by
1997.8
Although the Native Title Act was comprehensive, it failed
to thoroughly address the issue of whether the Crown's act of
permitting pastoral leases 5 was included in the category of
"past acts" to which native title was extinguished. This issue
was subsequently raised in the 1996 case of Wik Peoples v.
Queensland." In this case, the Wik and Thayorre people insti-
tuted an action contending that their title to the western side
of north Queensland's Cape York was not extinguished by the
grant of pastoral leases. 7 The High Court, in a 4-3 decision,
ruled in favor of the Aborigines and held that the pastoral
leases did not extinguish their native title.88 In its decision,
Justice Toohey noted that "inconsistency ... renders the na-
tive title rights unenforceable at law and, in that sense, extin-
guished. If the two can co-exist, no question of implicit extin-
guishment arises."89 In essence, the Wik case stands for the
proposition that Aborigines can claim title to land subject to
pastoral leases. However, Justice Toohey was clear in defining
83. See id. §§ 107-110.
84. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 554. These claims, however, are more signifi-
cant on paper than in practice. In order to bring a successful claim, the Aborigi-
nes must prove that their rights and interests were effected and that they have
maintained a connection with the land. See Native Title Act, § 223(1). This pres-
ents a problem for a substantial portion of Aborigines because they were forced to
relocate and were displaced from their land in the process. As a result, only two
percent of Australia's population qualify to bring native title claims. See Gilda C.
Rodriguez, Note, Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland: A Restrained Expansion of
Aboriginal Land Rights, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 711, 727 (1998).
85. Pastoral leases are leases granted by the government to non-natives who
wish to raise and herd cattle on large areas of land. This practice was prevalent
in the Australian "outback," where tens of thousands of Aborigines lived. Today, it
is estimated that forty-two percent of the Australian mainland is subject to pasto-
ral leases. See Peter H. Russell, High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples:
The Limits of Judicial Independence, 61 SASK. L. REv. 247, 267 (1998).
86. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.).
87. See id. at 136.
88. See id. at 132.
89. Id. at 184.
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this victory by limiting the potential claims to pastoral lease
cases where the rights of the grantee's of the pastoral leases
were being balanced. In cases where inconsistent uses of the
land arose between the Aborigine and the grantee of the pasto-
ral lease, the rights would be afforded to the grantee." Fur-
thermore, even where an Aborigine was successful in his na-
tive title claim, he was not provided the same rights as an
original owner of a freehold estate."' A successful claimant
was only entitled to limited use of the land, namely for such
things as hunting, gathering and fishing. His rights and inter-
est in the land were severely limited and nontransferable. 2
The Act also left many Australian states unsatisfied. In
1994, Western Australia, the largest state in Australia,
brought a case before the High Court alleging that the Native
Title Act was beyond the power of the Commonwealth and
should be held unconstitutional. 3 It alleged that the Austra-
lian Constitution did not provide the Commonwealth with the
authority to legislate land matters.94 The High Court dis-
agreed and ruled that the Native Title Act was constitutional,
finding a general power within the "races power" section of the
Australian Constitution.95 The Court interpreted the Native
Title Act as a special law which conferred this benefit.96 West-
ern Australia was successful, however, in proving that one
specific section of the Act was unconstitutional.97
90. See id. at 185.
91. See Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 728.
92. See id.
93. Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 128 A.L.R. 1, 3 (Austl.).
94. Id. at 10.
95. See id. at 43-44. The "races power" section grants the Commonwealth
authority to make laws regarding "[tihe people of any race for whom it is deemed
necessary to make special laws." AusrL. CONST. ch. I, pt. V, § 51 (xxvi).
96. See Western Australia, 128 A.L.R. at 43-44.
97. See Native Title Act, 1993, ch. 110, §12. Section 12 reads: "Subject to this
Act, the common law of Australia in respect of native title has, after 30 June
1993, the force of a law of the Commonwealth." Id. It was held invalid for at-
tempting to convey legislative power upon the judicial branch of the government.
See Western Australia, 128 A.L.R. at 62-65. However, the invalidity of this section
did not affect the validity of any other provisions of the Act. See id. at 65.
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III. NATIVE AMERICAN DEPRIVATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Native American Recognition Upon Colonization
Like the Aborigines of Australia, the Native American
Indians" of the United States have struggled to gain recogni-
tion to the land they claim is rightfully theirs. It is estimated
that when Columbus "discovered" America in 1492, 900,000 to
1,000,000 Native Americans inhabited the lands that subse-
quently became the United States.9 From the time of the
American Revolution through 1900, the United States acquired
over two billion acres of land which was previously occupied by
Native Americans throughout the continent.' Because the
United States is a world power, it acts as a role model for the
rest of the world.' Similarly, treatment of the indigenous
people of the United States is particularly crucial because
"[Indigenous Nations of North America are leaders in the
effort to ensure that Indigenous Peoples are represented in
international-forums."' 2
Interestingly, acceptance of Native American land owner-
ship has not always been a contentious issue. As early as the
sixteenth century, Francisco de Vitoria asserted that the Amer-
ican Indians were the true owners of their land and had com-
plete control over its public and private matters.0 3 Further-
more, early American settlers viewed the Native American
98. The tribes of the United States have certain unique characteristics. First,
the tribal nations are the only indigenous people in the United States. Second, the
term "tribal status" reflects the notion of collective or group rights, as opposed to
the European based trend of individualism. Third, Indians are allowed to expatri-
ate, i.e., withdraw from their tribes and live apart from their nation. See DAVID E.
WILmNS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE
MASKING OF JUSTICE 19 (1997).
99. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 543 n.65.
100. See id. at 548.
101. During her role as a U.S. representative on the Human Rights Commis-
sion, the Honorable Ada Deer observed that what was "[miost striking about the
struggles of indigenous peoples worldwide [was] that the United States is consis-
tently viewed as a role model in establishing and maintaining a legal framework
for recognizing and working with tribes." Honorable Ada Deer, Tribal Sovereignty
in the Twenty-First Century, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 17, 22-23 (1997). Judge Deer
stated that "[i]ndigenous peoples in other countries look to the United States for
inspiration and leadership in their quest to attain similar recognition and respect."
Id. at 23.
102. Robert H. Berry III, Note, Indigenous Nations and International Trade, 24
BROOK. J. INTL L. 239, 256 (1998).
103. See Anaya, supra note 2, at 2.
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territories as independent nations. U.S. legislative and judicial
jurisprudence is replete with examples of early recognition of
Native American sovereignty. For example, Indians are only
referenced in the U.S. Constitution three times. They are spe-
cifically mentioned in the Commerce Clause, 4 wherefore
Congress is explicitly granted the power to deal with Indian
related matters. The only other instances in which they are
mentioned is to omit them from the census if they fail to pay
taxes.' It is clear that Native Americans were not part of
the body politic of the United States so they were not ad-
dressed in any constitutional provisions. Instead, the Native
American tribes were viewed as foreign nations at the incep-
tion of our Constitution.
Further indication of the international status of Indian
tribes as viewed by the Framers is seen in the longstanding
history of treaty making with the Indians.' Even before the
signing of the Constitution, the United States had made nu-
merous treaties with the Indians. In fact, the first treaty be-
tween the United States and the Indians, entitled the United
States-Delaware Nation Treaty, 7 dates all the way back to
1778. Reinforcing the sovereign status of the Indians, this
treaty proposed that Delaware Nation delegates become mem-
bers of the Continental Congress. 8 Another example of Na-
tive American sovereignty is found in the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787'0° which proclaimed that "[t]he utmost good faith
shall always be observed towards the Indians; their land and
property shall never be taken from them without their consent;
and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be
104. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [to]
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.").
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; Id. amend. XIV § 2.
106. A treaty is defined as an international agreement between sovereign polit-
ical entities. See generally OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 11 (Sir Robert
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). The Supreme Court consistently
held for two centuries that treaties entered into with the Indians were on the
same level as treaties entered into with other foreign nations. In other words,
treaties were viewed as the supreme law of the land. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (interpreting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
107. Articles of Agreement and Confederation, Sept. 17, 1778, U.S.-Delaware
Nation, 7 Stat. 13.
108. Id. art. VI.
109. Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 1787 (adopted as amended at ch. 8, 1
Stat. 50 (1789)).
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invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorised by Congress.""' Lastly, the Treaty with the Sioux
Indians, signed in 1868, captured the spirit of this ideology by
proclaiming that "no white person or persons shall be permit-
ted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same [unceded
Indian territory]; or without the consent of the Indians... to
pass through the same.""'
B. The Marshall Trilogy"1
Notwithstanding this history of Native American recogni-
tion, as the United States grew in strength and power, its
acceptance of Native American property rights dramatically
diminished."' Legislation and case law began to reflect this
new perspective of domination over the tribes."4 By 1871, the
United States had acquired control of ninety-nine percent of
Native American land."5 Today, Native Americans only own
56.6 million acres of land in the entire United States."6
Chief Justice Marshall, although somewhat sympathetic to
the Native Americans for his time period, was a major imple-
menter of judicial policy and treatment towards Native Ameri-
can title. The first case in the Marshall trilogy, Johnson v.
M'Intosh,"' marked a significant change in the treatment of
Native Americans. In Johnson, Justice Marshall applied the
110. Id.
111. Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Sioux, XVI, 15 Stat.
635, 640.
112. The term "Marshall trilogy" refers to the three consecutively decided cases
on this subject: Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832). See Russell, supra note 85, at 248-54.
113. Other factors that have been attributed to this vast change were the de-
crease in the Indian population and its military capabilities. See Raymond Cross,
Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian Country in the
Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 431 (1998). Moreover, "[slubstantial
growth in the nineteenth-century non-Indian population, supplemented by the in-
flux of many landless European immigrants, required the states and private land
syndicates to shift from an Indian 'trading' to an Indian 'raiding' strategy as the
more efficient means of acquiring Indian lands." Id. at 455.
114. See generally, A History of Indian Jurisdiction, 2 AM. INDIAN J. 2 (1976).
115. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 546 n.88.
116. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET. AL, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 20 (3d ed. 1993).
117. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). This case involved a dispute over land pur-
chased by land speculators from the Indians in what is now Illinois. See id. See
also Russell, supra note 85, at 249.
BROOK. J. INTL L.
European doctrine of discovery"8 to determine the rights of
the indigenous people against the occupiers of the land. He
concluded that the land spectators did not have a right to the
land because the Native Americans were still entitled to the
use and occupancy of the property."' However, he recognized
that the rights of the Native Americans were significantly
diminished because they were forced to associate with Eng-
land, a country that consistently asserted her discovery rights.
This case set forth the principle that the Indians could only
sell their land to the Crown or the United States and estab-
lished a precedent for the federal government to justify strip-
ping away Native American rights to their land. 2 Further, it
created a landlord-tenant relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the Indians tribes, where the government was
the tyrannical landlord possessing complete power over the
lives of the Indians. 2'
The next major case in the Marshall trilogy was Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,2 wherein the Cherokee tribe sought an
injunction against the state of Georgia to stop them from en-
forcing state laws upon Cherokee land." Although Marshall
expressed sympathy for the Cherokee people, he ultimately
concluded that they lacked status to bring suit in a U.S.
court.2 In this case, Marshall discussed the unique relation-
ship between the Indians and the United States, rendering the
status of Indians as "domestic dependent nations," analogous
to "that of a ward to his, guardian."" He remarked that the
118. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572-74. Simply stated, the European
doctrine of discovery means that if the European explorers "discovered" the con-
tested area, that European nation had exclusive rights and control over the land
and the people occupying it. Id. See Williams, supra note 1, at 672. For a general
discussion of this doctrine, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS. JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990).
119. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574. This reasoning was a reflection of
the seminal international scholar Francisco de Vitoria. See Anaya, supra note 2, at
2; Bravo, supra note 4, at 544-45.
120. See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
121. See WILKINS, supra note 98, at 31.
122. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id. at 17. In his notorious dicta, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and,
heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right
shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it
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framers did not specify Indians as people who were entitled to
bring suit and, alternatively, the Indians should appeal to the
tomahawk. 2 '
Only one year later, Marshall afforded some protection to
the Cherokees in Worcester v. Georgia.'27 In this case, he
evaluated the history of treatment towards Native Americans
and their independence, concluding that the Native American's
rights in the treaty with the United States entitled them to
protection.'28 As a result, the Court struck down the Geor-
gian law which attempted to destroy the Cherokee's political
community and possession of their land. 2 ' Remarkably, this
case recognized Indian sovereignty and established that legal
consent was required to extinguish native title of the Indi-
ans. '3 During this time period, this case was the most pro-
gressive and comprehensive judicial statement regarding the
status of Native Americans and their property rights. 3' Un-
fortunately, this decision looked promising in theory, but re-
mained virtually unenforced against Georgia.'32
may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the ac-
knowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be de-
nominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which
we assert a title independent of their will which must take effect in
point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they
are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian.
Id.
126. Id. at 18.
127. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
128. See id. at 556.
This treaty [between the United States and the Cherokee Nation], thus
explicitly recognizing the national character of the Cherokees, and their
right of self government; thus guarantying [sic] their lands; assuming the
duty of protection, and of course pledging the faith of the United States
for that protection; has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force.
Id.
129. See id. at 520.
130. See JILL NORGEN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW
AND POLITICS 146 (1996) (discussing the significance of the Worcester opinion and
its failure to accomplish its goals).
131. See id. at 142.
132. See Russell, supra note 85, at 251-52. Chief Justice Marshall's opinions
were met with political adversity. President Andrew Jackson, a proponent of west-
ward expansion, allegedly said, "John Marshall has made his decision: now let him
enforce it!" HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1846). Consequently,
the Worcester decision was not enforced, and the Cherokee Indians were forced off
their lands and marched across the Mississippi river in what is now known as the
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C. Early Legislative Battles for Native American Native Title
As shown by the significant case law above, challenging
title to land through the judicial system presented considerable
obstacles for Native Americans. Likewise, the barriers present-
ed to the Native Americans through legislative reform left
much to be desired. Indian treaties had long legitimized the
process of taking Native American land with a promise of fu-
ture land or monetary compensation. However, as time pro-
gressed, the Indians were pushed further west without com-
pensation, and transactions were no longer made at arms-
length.'33 The time period between President Thomas Jeffer-
son and Andrew Jackson marked a national policy of removal
of the Indians through separation against their will.'34 As
early as 1790, Congress enacted the first of what would later
be the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act,135 in which Con-
gress promulgated authority and forbade unauthorized trade
with Indians. 8 This Act, however, was met with great ad-
versity by private land owners and states rights advocates,
making its enforcement problematic.3 '
The late nineteenth century marked pivotal Congressional
involvement in Native American affairs. The time period from
1845-1887 is coined the "reservation era,"3 ' because the
strategy during this era was to force Indians, usually against
their will, out of their settled areas and onto confined reserva-
tions."'39 In 1871, Congress ended treaty making with the In-
dians.4 ' Although this was a significant development, this
"Trail of Tears." See McSloy, supra note 3, at 239.
133. See Cross, supra note 113, at 441-45.
134. See Ralph W. Johnson, Indian Tribes and the Legal System, 72 WASH. L.
REV. 1021; 1022 (1997).
135. An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, 33 Stat.
137 (1790) (repealed in 1793).
136. A later version of this statute defined Indian country as:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not
within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas,
and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river,
and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extin-
guished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and deemed to be the
Indian Country.
Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
137. See Cross, supra note 113, at 449.
138. See Johnson, supra note 134, at 1023.
139. See id.
140. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 25
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Act only prohibited treaties executed after 1871. ' Conse-
quently, all prior treaties were still in effect." This meant
that the 371 formal treaties entered into between the United
States and the Native Americans between 1778 and 1871 were
still recognized.' More importantly, by ending treaty mak-
ing authority, the House of Representatives achieved its goal of
helping control Indian policy making for the future.'" The
problem with this Act, however, was that Congress did not
abrogate the existing treaties, thus leaving the Indians in a
quasi-sovereign status.'45 As a result, the Act had the effect
of thwarting the trust relationship between the United States
and the Indians and opened the doors for Congress to consis-
tently ignore the interests of Native Americans. "6
In a continuation of its policy of involvement in Native
American affairs, Congress enacted the General Allotment
Act, 1 which broke up the land held communally by Native
Americans into small homesteads of land, which were desig-
nated to individual tribal members for farming and ranch-
ing. Lastly, Congress set up a program which distributed
U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). The Act reads "hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an indepen-
dent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty."
Id. at 566. See also Cross, supra note 113, at 443-44; Susan Lope, Note and Com-
ment, Indian Giver: The Illusion of Effective Legal Redress for Native American
Land Claims, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 331, 336 (1994).
141. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 20, 16 Stat. 544 (1871) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)). See also Cross, supra note 113, at 443-44.
142. See Cross, supra note 113, at 443-44.
143. See Ward Churchill, Implications of Treaty Relationships Between the Unit-
ed States and Various American Indian Nations, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE
LAW: CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN INDIAN RIGHTS,
FREEDOM, AND SOVEREIGNTY: NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 81 (John R. Wunder
ed., 1996).
144. Historically, the President controlled treaty making with the Indians. How-
ever, tension grew between the House of Representatives and the Senate because
the Senate had the power to ratify these treaties. The House's only job was to
expend the monies agreed to be apportioned by the President and Senate. This
Act was the House's way of becoming part of Indian policy making. See Cross,
supra note 113, at 460-61. By changing the balance of power from "negotiating" to
"legislating" treaties, any previously required consensus was stripped away from
the Indians. This imbalance was enhanced by the fact that the Indians were not
citizens and lacked any control over the legislation passed regarding them. See
McSloy, supra note 3, at 244.
145. See Cross, supra note 113, at 461.
146. See Lope, supra note 140, at 336-37.
147. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
148. The General Allotment Act sought to disband the Native Americans by
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the excess land from the General Allotment Act to the non-
Indian settlers. It is estimated that dispersing the land to
individuals under this method reduced the land held by Indi-
ans from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million acres in
1934.150
D. Twentieth Century Obstacles
Little progress for Native American protection was appar-
ent from the statutory and judicial jurisprudence of the early
twentieth century. America's notion of manifest destiny15' was
in full force and sensitivity towards this subject was at a lull.
The Kiowa and Comanche tribes, for example, were coerced
through false promises of land and monetary compensation
into signing an agreement with the government to give up
their land."2 A tribal member named Lone Wolf brought a
federal suit alleging that the allotting of the reservation was a
taking of their land and in violation of Article 12 of the Treaty
of Medicine Lodge Creek.'53 The lower courts determined that
149. See Cross, supra note 113, at 461.
150. See Johnson, supra note 134, at 1024-25. In June 1996, a class action
suit was brought by over 300,000 Native Americans alleging that the federal gov-
ernment had mishandled the allocation of funds from the 1887 General Allotment
Act. See John Gibeaut, Another Broken Trust, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 40. The
case sought a retrospective accounting of the trust funds and an order requiring
the government to improve the system. Cobell v. Babbit, 30 F. Supp.2d 24 (D.D.C.
1998). Judge Lamberth, the judge presiding over the case, has valued the claim
at $4 million. See Gibeaut, supra, at 42. The three years prior to the June 1999
trial date were filled with delays and lack of due diligence by the Department of
Justice, which resulted in a February 1999 contempt order requiring the federal
government to pay all of plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees. See Cobell v. Babbit,
37 F. Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999). These fees were determined to total $624,643.50.
See Cobell v. Babbit, No. Civ. 96-1285, 1999 WL 607188 at *21 (D.D.C. Aug. 10,
1999). The first phase of this bifurcated trial ended in late July 1999 and sought
a court-appointed special master with a separate power from the seemingly flawed
Indian Affairs Bureau. See Gibeaut, supra, at 43. Judge Lamberth is expected to
rule on this phase by Labor Day 1999. See id. The second phase, which is ex-
pected to occur in the fall or winter of 1999, seeks a reconciliation of the Native
American's trust accounts and could potentially cost the Interior Department $8
billion, the equivalent of an entire years budget. See id.
151. Manifest destiny was the nineteenth century ideology of the United States
to expand boundaries westward beyond the Pacific Ocean. The term was often
used to justify the relocating of Native Americans. See WILKINS, supra note 98, at
372-73.
152. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
153. Id. Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek required that Kiowa
and Comanche land would not be taken without the consent of at least three-
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taking of their land and in violation of Article 12 of the Treaty
of Medicine Lodge Creek.'53 The lower courts determined that
because Congress had the authority to allot the land, Congress,
and not the courts, should address this problem. 1" The Su-
preme Court, under the auspices of Justice White, ruled
against Lone Wolfs request for injunctive relief. This case,
significantly, applied the standard of good faith, which in-
structed that the courts will "presume that Congress acted in
perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians."5 ' This
standard, now used as precedent, is a major obstacle for Native
Americans to overcome merely to be heard by a judicial tribu-
nal.
The mid-twentieth century brought slight encouragement
to a somewhat bleak situation. In 1924, all Native Americans
became federally recognized U.S. citizens.'56 By the 1930s,
the American West had expanded to its capacity and it was
clear that Native Americans were not going to get the land
that they were falsely promised in various treaties. In 1934,
along with the era of the New Deal, Congress exercised its
intention to improve the conditions of the Native Americans.
Through the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934,' Con-
gress took the first steps in dealing with the disarray it had
caused through the lack of sufficient land and funds from the
General Allotment Act.5 8 The goal of these reforms was to
"promote the new federal policy of tribal economic development
and political self-determination."59
This goal of tribal revitalization is exemplified by the tem-
porary victories of the Native Americans in United States v.
Shoshone Tribe6 and United States v. Creek Nation.'6' In
153. Id. Article- 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek required that Kiowa
and Comanche land would not be taken without the consent of at least three-
fourths of the adult males in the tribe. Treaty with the Kiowa and Comanche
Tribes of Indians (Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek), Oct. 21, 1867, art. 12, 15
Stat. 581, 585.
154. See Cross, supra note 113, at 464.
155. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
156. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
157. Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934).
158. See id. See also Lawrence B. Landman, Article, International Protection for
American Indian Land Rights?, 5 B.U. INTL L.J. 59, 71 (1987).
159. Cross, supra note 113, at 467.
160. 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
161. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
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the Shoshone Tribe case, the Shoshone tribe challenged the
government's action of settling a new tribe on the Shoshone
territory because they had signed a treaty in 1868 which made
their reservation part of the United States but gave them the
exclusive use of their land for hunting and gathering. 16 2 The
Court, remarkably, responded that the government needed to
compensate the Shoshone's for this taking.'63 Similarly, in
Creek Nation, the Supreme Court afi ed the notion that the
guardian relationship between the U.S. government and the
Indians implies that Congress does in fact have duties towards
the Indians."' Both of these decisions gave hope to Native
Americans for possible recognition in the future. It has even
been thought that Shoshone Tribe overruled Lone Wolf.'
Unfortunately, this spirit was quickly thwarted by the Great
Depression and the subsequent world war. Later rulings of the
Court and continuous failures to procure progressive legisla-
tion are evidence of yet another shift from "self-determination"
back to "termination."'66
In 1942, Felix S. Cohen published his Handbook of Federal
Indian Law, which served as a guide for anyone working with
Indian law issues.'67 Most significantly, the efforts undertak-
en in connection with this book proved that Indian law was
alive and well in the twentieth century.'68 In 1946, the Indi-
an Claims Commission (ICC) was created to evaluate the Na-
tive American claims against the U.S. government.'69 Under
the ICC, Indians were entitled to compensation for their land if
they satisfied two conditions. First, they had to prove that
162. See Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 113-14.
163. See id. at 118.
164. See Creek Nation, 295 U.S. at 109-10.
165. See Cross, supra note 113, at 468.
166. See Johnson, supra note 134, at 1025-26.
167. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1942). See also
Johnson, supra note 134, at 1036.
168. Cohen's book has survived many revisions. Its 1982 version, which con-
dones self-determination and self-sufficiency, is widely used and cited today. See
Johnson, supra note 134, at 1037.
169. Indian Claims Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 79-726, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 70 to 70v-3 (1978)). Once the ICC was creat-
ed, the Supreme Court was quick to push Indian title claims before it to the Com-
mission, deeming this issue a political question which was non-justiciable. See
Cross, supra note 113, at 472-73. A perfect example of this shift in responsibility
is seen in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1995), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 174-77.
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Congress had affirmatively acted in the past to recognize their
use and occupancy of the land. This was shown through trea-
ties, statutes, or conduct. Second, the Indians had to show that
Congress did not act within the standard of good faith set forth
in Lone Wolf."' Unfortunately, the ICC was terminated in
1978, leaving the remaining cases to be heard by the Court of
Claims."' This transfer caused major problems for the Native
American claimants because claims that were compensable
under the ICC were no longer compensable under the jurisdic-
tion of the Court of Claims." 2 In addition, unlike title recog-
nized in treaties and other agreements, native title was not
compensable under the takings clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
1
'
3
In 1955, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians of Alaska brought suit
against the U.S. government to recover compensation for the
taking of timber from their land."4 The Tee-Hit-Tons alleged
that, unlike the Indians on the continent, they had a well-
defined and complex property rights and ownership system
which should be recognized." The Court observed this sys-
tem and determined that it was in fact a communal system
like all the other tribes, and therefore could not be compensat-
ed."6 In rejecting their claim for compensation, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed that Native American's rights to native title
were not constitutionally protected property rights and could
be extinguished."'
The 1980 decision in United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians"'8 furthered the government's control over Indian
170. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568.
171. The ICC was terminated by 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1978). Many factors can be
attributed to the failure of the ICC. Some examples are: 1) Only Indian tribes and
not individuals were entitled to bring claims before the ICC; 2) Claims were only
allowed to be heard if they arose before August 13, 1946; 3) Indians were not
entitled to interest from the time of the taking of their lands and their property
was appraised at the time of the taking rather than at the time of adjudication;
and, 4) Remedies from the ICC were limited to damages. See Cross, supra note
113, at 474-76.
172. 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1978). For a further discussion of the establishment of
the Court of Claims, see Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
173. See Cross, supra note 113, at 476 n.341.
174. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
175. See id. at 287-88.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 290.
178. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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property.'79 In this case, the Supreme Court analyzed the
good faith test and rejected it for a more difficult standard of
"good faith effort" test.8 ° Now, the focus is not on the eco-
nomic losses and hardships suffered by the Native Americans,
but whether the government was legitimate in its exercise of
plenary power over the Indian land.'' In applying this test,
the reviewing judge must evaluate the relevant legislative
history along with the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether Congress made a good faith effort in giving the Indi-
ans the full value of their lands. 2 This is a difficult test to
apply. In fact, Professor Raymond Cross stated that "[aibsent
an objective valuation standard, there is simply no reliable
reference point for the court's evaluation of claimed congressio-
nal good faith."' Thus, this is seemingly an arduous test,
and the federal government has successfully immunized itself
from all compensation which is not clearly an unfair taking.
E. The Future of Native American Land Rights
The future success of Native Americans with respect to
their land remains unclear. While there are many factors con-
tributing to this ambiguity, the most significant, in the opinion
of this author, is the lack of willingness to compromise be-
tween Native Americans and the federal government. Native
Americans currently exist as independent cultures with their
own customs, traditions, language, religion, and govern-
ment."8 As a result of their desire to preserve their own cul-
179. Id.
180. See id. at 407-17.
181. See Cross, supra note 113, at 438. Under Federal Indian Policy, the term
"plenary power" has three distinct meanings: a) exclusive-Congress has the sole
authority through the Commerce Clause to regulate affairs with the Indian tribes;
b) preemptive--Congressional action precludes state governments from acting in
matters related to the Indians; c) unlimited or absolute-judicial opinions have
vested in Congress what seems to be boundless authority over the Indians, includ-
ing their lands and resources. See WILKINS, supra note 98, at 373-74.
182. See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 416-17.
183. See Cross, supra note 113, at 497.
184. See Lope, supra note 140, at 352. According to Vine Deloria, this is the
result of "[tihe modem Indian movement for national recognition [which] has its
roots in the tireless resistance of generations of unknown Indians who have re-
fused to melt into homogeneity of American life and accept American citizenship."
Id. (citing VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 20 (1974)).
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ture and identity, hostility between Native Americans and the
rest of the country will likely continue. Unless a change in
philosophy or a compromise between Native Americans and
the federal government occurs, the possibility of increased
protection of Native Americans in today's society is highly
unlikely.
At the same time, it is difficult to comprehend why Ameri-
can citizens have been so unwilling to accept Native Americans
as their own distinct culture. Because it is the opinion of this
author that the United States is typically one of the most pro-
gressive countries in the world, it seems ironic that the laws
dictating Indian affairs from the 1800s are still cited as prece-
dent today. Interestingly, the Supreme Court's decision in Lone
Wolf was decided at the exact same time as its famous "sepa-
rate but equal" decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.'8 But fifty
years later, Plessy was overruled by Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion."6 Nonetheless, the unenforced decision of Lone Wolf,
and the deeply flawed interpretations of other Native Ameri-
can related opinions, remains the law controlling Native Amer-
ican affairs even today.
Another factor which significantly affects the future of
Native Americans is the composition of the current Supreme
Court. Recently, the Supreme Court has shown a lack of inter-
est in cases involving Native Americans.'87 Now that Justices
Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun have left the Court, the
status of Native American progression and protection is disput-
able. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens are
the only justices who have shown any serious interest in this
arena.'88 Whether the current Supreme Court justices are
185. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
186. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Another example of the U.S. legislature revisiting
outdated concepts of legislation affecting racial minorities is seen in the amending
of the Constitutional provisions regarding African Americans. At the inception of
the Constitution, African Americans were counted as only three-fifths of a vote.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. After the Civil War, the status of African Americans
changed and the Fourteenth Amendment struck down the three-fifths status. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Compare Native American provisions excluding them
from the body politic as "Indians not taxed," which remain unchanged. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2, amend. XIV, § 2. See McSloy, supra note 3, at 221.
187. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1631
(1996).
188. See id.
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willing to provide these protections plays a crucial role in the
future status of this issue.
Furthermore, a problem arises in the fact that current
federal Indian law embraces two contradictory doctrines.189
This inconsistency is blamed on the vague language in judicial
opinions concerning such crucial concepts as foreign nation
status, ward-guardian relationships, and federal authority over
Native American affairs. 9 ' One trend, following the reason-
ing of Cherokee Nation and Worcester, recognizes tribal sov-
ereignty and considers tribes domestic, dependent nations. 9'
These jurists continually interpret ambiguous treaty language
in favor of the Native Americans and place the burden of proof
and the standard of good faith on the federal government.'92
The other trend of jurisprudence reflects the legitimacy of
congressional plenary power over the Native Americans and
their status as "wards."'93 This concept has been expanded so
greatly that Congress today seems to have absolute power over
Indian affairs.
Fortunately, the situation is not completely bleak, as re-
cent political influences have provided some significant prog-
ress. During the 1990s, the Clinton administration put forth a
remarkable record regarding achievements on behalf of the
Native Americans.'94 During the early terms, of his Presiden-
cy, Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),'95 met with tribal leaders, and signed memorandum
commemorating the meeting which has been used in subse-
quent reports.' Further examples include the signing of an
executive order which promoted access to sacred sites on feder-
al lands,'97 and federal assistance to tribal colleges. 9
189. See NORGREN, supra note 130, at 151-52 (discussing the flaws of twentieth
century federal Indian law).
190. Id. at 151.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 152.
194. See Deer, supra note 101, at 21-22.
195. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993).
196. President Clinton met with tribal leaders on April 29, 1994. See Deer,
supra note 101, at 21-22 n.32.
197. Exec. Order No. 13007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
198. Exec. Order No. 13021, 3 C.F.R. 221 (1996). Continuing in his pledge to
better the situation for the Native Americans, President Clinton recently visited
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Although the future status of the Native Americans is
unclear, one thing that is clear is that a change is urgently
needed. Many suggestions have been provided as solutions to
this problem. One author proposed that the only solutionis to
reinstate the treaty status of the Native Americans by repeal-
ing the Act of 1877, and returning to the ideology that Native
American territories are independent foreign nations whose
controversies with the United States should be dealt with in
an international arena.19 9 Another suggested that a modern
Indian takings doctrine should be implemented to mitigate the
government's incentive to take Indian land through congressio-
nal plenary power."'0 The Indians, he argued, should not be-
come equal bargainers with the federal government. Rather,
they should be provided heightened scrutiny in the protection
of what little land they still own.2 ' This hypothetical takings
doctrine would ideally require the federal government to pro-
vide just compensation for any further takings of Indian land
through appropriate awards, replacements, or compensation
for lost resources.0 2
Whether one of the academic solutions proffered in this
Note is adopted, or another alternative is accepted, the fact
remains that something must be done. The history of the Na-
tive Americans has been so tumultuous that it has been
analogized to a "long sine wave that gradually diminishes, a
historical oscillation between recognition of Indian sovereignty
and virulent assimilationist policies, with the highs and lows
flattening out as time progresses.""' It is clear that the
struggle between the principles of sovereignty and plenary
the Oglala Lakota Sioux reservation in South Dakota. See Peter T. Kilborn,
Clinton, Amid the Squalor on a Reservation, Again Pledges Help, N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1999, at A16. When President Clinton spoke to the tribal members about their
living condition, he afforded them respect by labeling the meeting a "nation to na-
tion" visit. Id. This was the first time a President had visited an Indian reserva-
tion since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936. Id.
199. See Lope, supra note 140, at 333. Similarly, McSloy suggests we go "back
to the future" where Native American sovereignty was more prevalent than it is
today. He agrees that Native American sovereignty should be based solely upon an
"international, treaty-oriented system of diplomacy," which recognizes the inherent
sovereign status of Indian nations. See McSloy, supra note 3, at 225.
200. See Cross, supra note 113, at 432.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. McSloy, supra note 3, at 250.
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power must come to some semblance of a compromise for any
progress to be successful. Despite the federal governments
attempts to extinguish Native American culture, the Native
Americans have consistently proven their endurance and de-
termination to gain recognition and protection of their land.
This is a problem that has and will not vanish, and in due
time the U.S. government must recognize these people's funda-
mental rights.
IV. A COMPARISON OF AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Lessons To Be Learned
As shown above, both Australia and the United States
have struggled to accommodate their indigenous populations.
Yet, the reactions of both countries to their indigenous people
are clearly at a variance to one another. Most importantly,
their later attempts to compensate their indigenous popula-
tions provide practical examples and lessons for developing
countries." 4 One lesson that both countries can provide is a
startling example of the urgency of proper treatment towards
indigenous populations and the dangers that ensue as a result
of improper treatment.0 5 Each country has had positive and
negative results and an analysis of these experiences can show
a country facing similar obstacles what they should and should
not do.
B. Treatment Upon Colonization
The first major comparison that is worth noting between
the United States and Australia is their treatment by England
upon colonization. Like its customary practices with all its
conquests, England attempted to afford protection to the Na-
tive Americans of the United States through consensual trea-
ties. No such treaties or attempts at appeasement were ever
offered to the Australian Aborigines.0 6 Instead, England jus-
tified its domination of the Aborigines by categorizing them as
backwards people.
Secondly, a stark contrast can be seen in each country's
204. See Bravo, supra note 4, at 555.
205. Id. at 573.
206. See supra Section IIL
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views towards its indigenous people upon colonization. While
the Aborigines were uncivilized and barbaric to the Europeans,
the Indians were considered independent nations with their
own culture and even their own Constitutions."' Psychologi-
cally speaking, the Native Americans faced a more difficult
struggle because they were afforded protections that were
quickly taken away. "When it was no longer convenient for the
United States to deal with [the Native Americans] as indepen-
dent 'foreign' nations, their status was changed solely because
of their existence within the United States borders, in hopes of
assimilating them into western culture."0 ' Being that their
status is so attenuated today, it seems ironic that the Native
Americans were treated with greater respect and sovereignty
by Columbus and the early settlers than they have been the
past two centuries. The Aborigines, in contrast, have been
faced with an upward battle towards acceptance and respect.
These paradoxical views towards both indigenous populations
has had a considerable impact on the treatment that each
country has subsequently provided.
C. Access To The Courts
Another major difference concerning indigenous people's
land rights in the United States and Australia is the use and
accessibility of the court systems." 9 In short, the American
courts have been entangled in Native American issues since
the inception of the judicial system. In contrast, it was not
until the latter part of this century that the Australian High
Court played a role in the determination of Aboriginal land
rights. It is questionable, however, whether the early role of
the American courts has had a negative or positive effect on
the status of the Native Americans. It is this author's conten-
tion that this judicial interference has primarily had a detri-
mental effect.
Unlike the United States, the early history of Australia
did not provide any John Marshall-like proponents to rally for
the rights of the Aborigines.210 Rather, the Australian court
207. See supra Section III.A.
208. Lope, supra note 140, at 350.
209. See Russell, supra note 85, at 254.
210. Id.
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system reflected the practice of "material dispossession and
political subjugation... but without the camouflage of friendly
high court decisions."M  The Aborigine's main source of land
rights were their own systems of law and politics and the little
protection they were provided by the common-law courts.212
The doctrine of terra nullius and the perspective that the Ab-
origines were backwards and uncivilized people were embed-
ded in these early practices. In fact, it wasn't until the 1970s,
in the Milirrpum case, that the Aborigines were afforded even
the slightest protection.1 3 Consequently, it is an uncontested
fact that the biggest changes in Australia have come about
within the last decade.214 Upon examination of recent statis-
tics regarding land claims, it is estimated that Australian Ab-
origines today have potential claims to seventy-nine percent of
Australia's land.2" A mere ten years ago, their ownership
claims were only fourteen percent.1 ' In hindsight, it seems
that Australia's lack of a forum for vindication of rights until
much later made her more flexible and open to the vast chang-
es that have developed in the latter part of this century.2 1
In contrast, the U.S. courts have a long history of deep
involvement in Native American affairs." 8 Yet, Professor Pe-
ter H. Russell suggests that the Indians' reliance on the "white
man's courts" to adjudicate their rights "blunt[ed] the capacity
of America's Indigenous peoples for more autonomous forms of
political action and prevent[ed] Aboriginal issues from becom-
ing as prominent on [the United States] political agenda as
they now are in Australia, Canada and New Zealand." 19 Sim-
211. Id.
212. See id.
213. Milirrpum, 17 F.L.R. at 13. For a discussion of this case, see supra Sec-
tion II.B.
214. While justifring the importance of the Mabo case, Justices Deane and
Gaudron epitomized this radical change in perspective when they stated:
The acts and events by which that dispossession in legal theory was
carried into practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of
this nation. The nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and
until there is an acknowledgment of, and retreat from, those past injus-
tices.
Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 82.
215. See Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 711.
216. Id.
217. See Russell, supra note 85, at 254. See also infra Section V.
218. See Russell, supra note 85, at 254.
219. Id.
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ilarly, it is this author's contention that the early judicial in-
volvement in Native American affairs, specifically with respect
to their land, served as a hindrance and not a benefit. From a
psychological perspective, it is more difficult to have status and
rights taken away than face an upward struggle to gain them
from the outset. It is unfortunate that the Native Americans,
in a sense, "used up" their advantages so early on in American
history while the rest of the world continues to reap the bene-
fits of the United States' mistakes. This scenario reflects a
disheartening ideology that the past is irrelevant and it only
matters what has been done to rectify the present situation. If
this is the belief among the Native Americans, the current re-
sponse of the federal government can only be interpreted as
callous and unsympathetic.
V. CONCLUSION
Although both Australia and the United States still have
significant strides to make in truly accommodating their indig-
enous populations, Australia seems to provide a better example
of treatment towards native title in the latter part of the twen-
tieth century. However, no discredit should be given to the
efforts made by the United States. Rather, the U.S. example is
one of the major reasons that Australia has even been afforded
an opportunity to progress in this area.
Australia has at its advantage the benefit of being a youn-
ger and perhaps a more easily influenced country. Simply
stated, now that she has made the giant leap towards change,
she has the flexibility to change more than any other country,
particularly the United States. In deciding Mabo, the High
Court expressed it best when it observed that Australia's legal
treatment towards its indigenous people "should neither be nor
be seen to be frozen in an age of racial discrimination"22 and
should be in accord with international human rights. Knowing
full well the political and legal repercussions, not many coun-
tries are willing to make such a drastic change. Australia has
taken the lessons of her mother country, England, as well as
the United States, and learned from them. Although Australia
has a significant history of her own, it is not nearly as lengthy
or complex as the rest of the world, making it easier for her to
220. Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 28.
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admonish it entirely and begin anew. Ideally, "Australia can
use Mabo to make a clean break with the past and learn from
the successes and failures of countries sharing a significant
cultural and legal bond."22
Australia owes a lot of credit to the experiences of the
United States. As seen in this Note, without the early history
of the Native Americans and their connections to the land,
Australia would not have had the foundation to base her revo-
lutionary Mabo decision upon. Arguably, it took a long time for
Australia to begin to make changes in this area, but this too
can be used to her advantage. Modern times bring with them
radical theories and technology to implement ideas. The fact
that these changes have only come about within the past ten
years, coupled with the knowledge of the lessons of the past,
leaves the door open for insurmountable flexibility in treat-
ment of native title in the years to come. If Australia continues
along this path of protection and acceptance with the rest of
the world following her example, the opportunities that may be
provided for indigenous people in the new millennium will be
endless.
Amy Sender
221. Meyers & Mugamnbwa, supra note 8, at 1240.
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